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Quantum technologies hold the promise of not only faster algorithmic processing of data, via
quantum computation, but also of more secure communications, in the form of quantum cryptog-
raphy. In recent years, a number of protocols have emerged which seek to marry these concepts for
the purpose of securing computation rather than communication. These protocols address the task
of securely delegating quantum computation to an untrusted device while maintaining the privacy,
and in some instances the integrity, of the computation. We present a review of the progress to date
in this emerging area.
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost as long as programmable computers have existed, there has been a strong motivation for users to run
calculations on hardware that they do not personally control. Initially, this was due to the high cost of such devices
coupled with the need for specialised facilities to house them. Universities, government agencies and large corporations
housed computers in central locations where they ran jobs for their users in batches. Over time computers have become
ubiquitous, but demand for centralised resources has not abated. Even today, the use of delegated computation is
widespread, in the form of cloud computing.
While we do not yet know how the field of quantum computing will develop, it seems reasonable to speculate
that it will follow a similar path. Indeed this speculation is somewhat born out by recent efforts to provide access
to rudimentary quantum processors over the Internet [1]. Today we are in a far better position to enable remote
access to quantum computers than was possible with early conventional computers, due to the existence of high speed
global communications networks, and the ubiquity of classical processors. Furthermore, the discovery of quantum key
distribution protocols [2, 3] has provided the impetus to develop quantum communication over existing optical fibre
networks [4]. These factors only serve to increase the scope for early adoption of delegated quantum computation.
While the option of delegating calculations to remote systems may have strong practical and economic motivation,
it opens a myriad of security concerns. In particular, if the computation is performed on untrusted hardware, then
this opens the possibility that either the privacy or the integrity of the computation may be compromised. Encryption
can be used to hide communication between the client and the server from eavesdroppers, while authentication codes
can be used to detect any attempt to modify these messages [5]. However, such techniques do nothing to counteract
the threat posed by a compromised or malicious server. Ideally, to overcome these concerns, one would want a way
to delegate tasks to a remote server while ensuring privacy, even from the server executing them, and to ensure the
correctness of the result.
In recent years, a number of protocols have emerged which seek to tackle the privacy issues raised by delegated
quantum computation. Going under the broad heading of blind quantum computation (BQC), these provide a way
for a client to execute a quantum computation using one or more remote quantum servers while keeping the structure
of the computation hidden. While the goal of BQC protocols is to ensure only the privacy of the computation, many
also allow for verification of the computation being performed, by embedding hidden tests within the computation.
To date blind quantum computation has been considered in a wide range of settings, with varying requirements
on the capability of the client and the server or servers. Ultimately, the most desirable setting would be a verifiable
blind quantum computation protocol which could be performed between a client without any quantum capabilities
and a single quantum server. Unfortunately, progress on such a protocol has proved slow. Part of the difficulty is
that the server could retain a complete transcript of the communication during the protocol, allowing them to rerun
their side of the process many times. Indeed, a no-go result from Morimae and Koshiba ruled out a wide class of
potential protocols [6]. Furthermore, results from classical secure computing create a link between blind computing
and computational complexity [7]. The existence of a sufficiently secure blind computation protocol with a purely
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2classical client and a single quantum server capable of implementing arbitrary quantum computations would create
a link between the questions of whether BQP contains NP and whether the polynomial hierarchy collapses [8]. As a
result of these hurdles, it is only very recently that mechanisms which may allow for such functionality have begun
to emerge [9].
As a result, progress on blind computation has come from considering settings which relax these restrictions
somewhat. There are several ways in which this can be done, which can broadly be divided into two categories:
Settings which relax the requirement that the client be purely classical, and settings which allow for multiple non-
communicating quantum servers. Settings considered in the first category augment the client with some quantum
capability which is insufficient for quantum computation unaided. The motivation behind this approach is that it
may be plausible to allow the client to prepare or measure single qubit states [10, 11], or perhaps to have a small
quantum processor of their own [12]. On the other hand, the second category maintains a classical client, but allows
that client to interact with multiple servers [13]. In all known protocols of this type, the privacy of the computation
is only maintained provided that the servers do not communicate. While it is in principle possible to achieve this for
short periods by using position to enforce spacelike separation between servers during the protocol, it may be difficult
to guarantee blindness indefinitely in any realistic scenario.
II. SECURITY
Before diving into the protocols which have been proposed to accomplish blind quantum computation, it is necessary
to clarify what precisely this statement means at a more formal level. Just as many configurations of client and server
have been considered in the literature, a variety of security definitions have also been proposed. At an intuitive
level, security definitions for this problem seek to capture, at a minimum, the idea that a malicious server or servers
should be unable to distinguish between possible computations chosen by the client, based on the information they
receive during the protocol. Certain information cannot be hidden. The server will always know the resources they
committed to the computation and so can always determine an upper bound on depth and width of the quantum
circuit corresponding to the client’s chosen computation. However, it is in principle possible to hide all other aspects
of the computation and to pad the circuit so that the circuit dimensions reveal little information about the hidden
computation. In formulating a security definition for blind computation, it is hence important to account for this
leakage of information. In this section, we will focus primarily on security definitions that are information theoretic in
nature, avoiding the necessity for assumptions on the computational power of the adversary which are characteristic
of much of modern classical cryptography.
The term blind quantum computation was first coined by Arrighi and Salvail [14] to describe the encryption of
instances of certain problems so that they could be delegated while preserving privacy, building upon similar ideas
introduced in the classical regime by Feigenbaum [15]. The first protocol and security definition for securely delegating
arbitrary quantum computations, termed universal blind quantum computation, was introduced in [16]. There blind-
ness was defined in the following way. Given a description of a client’s computation x, a protocol was said to be blind
while leaking at most L(x) if the distribution of classical and quantum information received by the server was fully
determined by L(x). The purpose of the function L(x) is to capture information unavoidably leaked, which may differ
from protocol to protocol but is most often taken to be the circuit dimensions of the delegated computation. In effect,
this definition demands that the information received by the server not depend on any aspect of the client’s chosen
computation other than what is captured by L(x). Much of the work on blind computation to date has implicitly
or explicitly used some form of this definition. A notable exception to this trend was presented in [17] which made
use of a weakened definition, requiring only that attempts to violate the privacy of the computation be detected with
high probability, in order to optimise communications overhead.
While the previous definition captures the spirit of blind quantum computation, it has certain undesirable features.
In particular it does not fully determine how a protocol satisfying that definition will behave as part of a larger system.
For example, if the server were to deviate from the protocol, they would still only learn at most L(x). However, if
subsequent to the conclusion of the protocol, they were to learn something about the resulting state received by the
client, it might be possible for them to infer additional details of the computation. To this end, stronger security
definitions for delegated computation have been proposed which seek to fully define the behaviour of BQC protocols
[18] using the abstract cryptography framework of Maurer and Renner [19].
This is achieved through the use of the notion of an ideal resource, which fully describes the functionality of blind
computation without making reference to any particular protocol. This can be thought of as a black box process with
several interfaces through which the client and server can interact with it, as shown in Figure 1A. Several of these
interfaces allow for the passing of quantum information, which may in general be in a non-separable state. Hence
the labels on each interface refer to quantum systems rather than to the corresponding states directly, such that for
example ψA and ψB are two subsystems of a compound system ψAB . The system ψA represents the description of
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FIG. 1: A) A schematic of the ideal resource for blind computation. Here the convention is used that the client’s interfaces are
on the left, while the server’s interfaces are on the right. B) A representation of how the two protocols piA and piB are combined
with a communications resource R in order to implement a channel mapping ψA to ρA. C) A schematic of a simulator which
can be appended to the right side of ideal resource so that the interfaces of the compound object match those of piAR.
the client’s computation together with any included quantum input, such that the output of the chosen computation
is given by U(ψA) for a fixed unitary operator U known to both the client and the server. This use of a quantum
state to represent the description of the computation as well as the input can be thought of as providing input for
a programmable device which includes both the programme and the input data, and can be done without loss of
generality. The system ρA represents the output obtained by the client, while `ψA represents the leaked information
obtained by the server based on the client’s computation. In general these can all be considered to be quantum
states, though for specific use cases they may be classical. A single bit, b, is used to indicate whether the server
chooses to deviate from the protocol. The specification of B and the relationship between the output ρA and the
other inputs depends on whether or not verification is included. In the case where only blindness is considered, the
description of the ideal resource, denoted Sblind is completed by choosing B = (E , ψB), with E being a completely
positive trace-preserving map (capturing the server’s interference with the computation) and ψB being a quantum
system, and fixing ρA = U(ψA) when b = 0 and ρA = E(ψAB) when b = 1, where ψAB is the joint system composed of
subsystems ψA and ψB . In the case where verification is included, the ideal resource Sblindverif is completed by choosing
B to be a single bit c. If c = 0 then ρA = U(ψA), otherwise when c = 1 the output gives some fixed error state
ρA = |err〉〈err| orthogonal to the usual output space. Thus c captures the possibility of the server causing an error in
the computation, but requires that it be perfectly detectable by the client.
With the ideal resources specified, security definitions can then be given which relate a concrete protocol to the ideal
resource. A concrete BQC protocol is composed of a pair of protocols, piA for the client and piB for the server, which
interact via a communications channel indicated by R, as illustrated in Figure 1B. In this framework, a BQC protocol
should satisfy two conditions in order to be considered secure, correctness and blindness. Correctness captures the
notion that the output of the proposed protocol actually matches the behaviour of the ideal resource when the server
is behaving honestly. We can consider the composition of protocols and resources using αβ to denote the composition
of two such objects where the right side interfaces of α match and are connected to the left hand interfaces of β. A
protocol is then said to be -correct if the quantum channel implemented by piARpiB is -close in the diamond norm to
the channel given by S⊥B , where ⊥B denotes that the server is restricted to behaving honestly and so obstructs his
interfaces (setting b = 0 and c = 0). Here S is taken to be either Sblind or Sblindverif depending on whether verifiability
is included. The blindness condition captures the notion that the server should not be able to learn more than if
they were interacting with the ideal functionality, but is stronger than the definition considered earlier. A protocol
is -blind if piAR is -close to SσB for some simulator σB in the appropriate norm. This is stronger than demanding
that the server learn no more than they can from the ideal resource, since it implies that any party having access both
to the server and client interfaces of the compound objects cannot distinguish piAR from SσB . This is an important
feature, since it means that in analysis of larger systems which makes use of blind computation as a component, the
concrete BQC protocol can be replaced by an ideal functionality, provided  is sufficiently small. For a more thorough
treatment of composable security definitions for blind computation, curious readers are referred to [20].
The above discussion focuses on blindness or the combination of blindness and verifiability, rather than on verifiabil-
ity alone. A much wider variety of non-equivalent definitions has been considered for this latter property, and a review
of all such definitions is beyond the scope of the current manuscript. There does, however, appear to be a deep link
between notions of blindness and verification. Several protocols designed primarily to verify quantum computation
have turned out to yield BQC protocols with minimal or no changes [12, 24], while the notion of embedding hidden
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FIG. 2: Approaches to verifying blind quantum computation. A) The approach taken to verification in [16] and [21]. The
client chooses the computation such with some fixed probability each logical qubit may be a “trap”, for which the outcome
can be easily computed by the client and used to detect any deviation from the protocol by the server. B) In [22] individual
physical qubits, rather than logical qubits, are used as traps. By hiding Z-basis measurements on the neighbouring qubits the
client can surreptitiously disentangle a chosen qubit from the rest of the resource state. The net result is that the outcome
for the measurement of the trap qubit in an honest run of the protocol is known in advance by the client, and hence can be
used to verify that the server has not introduced an error into the computation. C) In the setting where the client performs
adaptive measurements on a fixed resource state, performing measurements on the received qubits to ensure that they satisfy
the same stabiliser relations as the ideal resource offers an alternative mechanism to ensure that the server behaves honestly.
This approach was initially proposed in [23].
traps within a computation, as shown in Figure 2, has been used to make several BQC protocols verifiable [22, 23].
Recently, however, several verification schemes have emerged which do not seem to immediately give rise to blind
computation protocols [25–27], and so it remains an open question as to whether or not these are truly independent
properties.
III. BQC WITH SEMI-CLASSICAL CLIENTS
A. Restricted quantum computation
quantum
processor
quantum
computer
transversal
logic gates
logical
qubits
ServerClientServer
quantum memory
Pauli
operators
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σ
FIG. 3: A) An illustration of the BQC setting considered by Childs [28]. In this scenario, the client has a large quantum
memory together with the ability to perform Pauli operations on qubits and to transmit them to the server. However they lack
the ability to perform other gates, such as Toffoli or Hadamard gates. B) An illustration of the setting considered by Aharonov,
Ben-Or and Eban [12], in which the client has access to a quantum computer capable of performing arbitrary operations on a
constant number of qubits.
The first blind quantum computation protocol is widely attributed to Childs [28], who introduced an interactive
protocol which allowed a user with restricted quantum capabilities to perform universal quantum computation with the
aid of a second party possessing a universal quantum computer, while keeping the specifics of the computation hidden.
In the scenario originally considered, the client had a large quantum memory with the ability to rearrange qubits
and to perform Pauli operations, but lacked the ability to perform non-Pauli gates and to perform measurements.
5The ability to perform Pauli gates allowed the client to encrypt qubits using a quantum one-time pad (i.e. applying
a random Pauli to each qubit) before sending them to the server. The client selects a qubit or qubits to perform an
operation on, applies a random quantum one-time pad, and transmits them to the server. The server then applies
the desired operation before returning the qubits to the client. When encoded in this way, measurements made by
the server revealed no information about the state of the encoded qubit, but can be decoded by the client using the
one-time pad key. Furthermore, Clifford group gates can be applied by the server directly onto the encrypted state
provided that the client update their encryption key. This is due to the fact that given a Clifford group operator
C, a multi-qubit Pauli operator σ and and quantum state |ψ〉, Cσ |ψ〉 = σ′C |ψ〉 where σ′ = CσC†. The procedure
for implementing non-Clifford group gates is a little more involved. Consider the result of the server applying the
gate T = |0〉〈0| + eipi4 |1〉〈1| to a state encrypted with a quantum one-time pad given by the Pauli operator σ. If σ
commutes with T , then trivially Tσ |ψ〉 = σT |ψ〉 and the gate has been successfully applied on the encrypted state. If
however σ does not commute with T , then it is because σ contains either an X or Y term corresponding to the qubit
on which T is being applied. In this case Tσ |ψ〉 = σT † |ψ〉. While this is not the desired result, it is possible to make
a correction by applying the gate S = T 2, which is in the Clifford group and hence can be applied deterministically
by the server using the previous procedure. One caveat is that if the server is only requested to apply an S gate
following a T gate if σ does not commute with T on the chosen qubit, then information about the encoded state is
revealed. In order to avoid this scenario, following each T gate the server must always be requested to perform an S
gate. In the case where S is unnecessary, the client simply chooses an ancillary qubit for it to be performed on. Since
the qubit is returned to the client between each step, and the one-time pad renewed, there is no mechanism for the
server to distinguish between the two cases. As these operations together are sufficient for approximately-universal
quantum computation, the client can thus make use of the server to implement an arbitrary quantum computation
without revealing their state. This can be extended to hide the full computation by requiring that the server always
implement a fixed order of gates (say Hadamard, CNOT, T , S) where the client simply choses to have unwanted gates
applied to an ancillary pair of qubits.
A notable feature of this protocol is that the quantum resources required of the client depends on the computation
being performed. Furthermore, while Childs discussed the issue of verification, noting that the computation could
be verified by a classical client if it resulted in a witness for an instance of a problem in NP and speculating on the
use of tomography on a subset of gates as a mechanism for keeping a memoryless server honest, the protocol did not
provide a general mechanism for verifying the correctness of general computation. Subsequent work has sought to
both reduce the requirements on the client and to ensure verifiability of the computation. Specifically, an alternate
approach taken by Aharanov, Ben-Or and Eban in the context of developing interactive proofs for BQP, which shifts
the memory requirement to the server [12]. In the ABE protocol, the client is used to prepare the initial state for
the computation, encoded using a polynomial code introduced in [29] which amounts to a quantum authentication
scheme [30]. This can be done logical qubit by logical qubit, and so the size of the client’s device need not scale as a
function of the number of qubits in their chosen computation, but can be as low as 3 qubits. The algebraic structure
of the encoding allows for the server to implement Clifford gates transversally, provided that the client update their
encryption key, and so by making use of gate teleportation using magic states prepared by the client it is possible to
implement an approximately universal gate set. Just as in the case of Childs’ protocol, the encoding hides the client’s
input state only. However, by making use of a fixed programmable unitary, similar to that used in the composable
security definitions discussed earlier, this can be leveraged into a BQC protocol, hiding not only the input but also the
intended computation. Furthermore, the use of an authentication code ensures that the computation can be verified
with constant probability of error.
B. State preparation
While the approaches described in the previous section do allow a client with limited quantum capabilities to
harness the power of a larger quantum computer, they require reasonably sophisticated apparatus on the client’s side.
As we shall see, it is possible to further reduce the complexity of the client’s device. The universal blind quantum
computing protocol (UBQC) introduced in [16] manages to hide arbitrary quantum circuits with a client only capable
of preparing certain single qubit quantum states. Rather than directly implementing a computation as a series of
gates applied to a fixed register of qubits, the UBQC protocol implements the desired circuit as a measurement-based
computation.
In order to understand how the UBQC protocol works, it is first necessary to understand how a computation can
be expressed in the measurement-based model. In measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC), a quantum
computation is expressed as a sequence of single-qubit measurements to be performed on a fixed resource state [33].
These resource states are known as graph states, due to their correspondence to simple graphs. The resource state
corresponding to a particular graph G can be determined as the output of a circuit specified as follows. For each vertex
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FIG. 4: The structure of measurement-based computation using the brickwork state as the resource. A) The brickwork state
underlying the UBQC protocol [16]. The same resource state has previously been considered in [31]. Logical qubits propagate
along horizontal chains of vertices from right to left. These can be thought of as corresponding to wires in a quantum circuit
diagram, with each vertex corresponding to the application of a single qubit gate, and vertical edges corresponding to controlled-
phase gates between neighbouring qubits. The graph of the resource state is constructed from a regular tiled unit cell. B)
Possible choices for measurements within the unit cell giving rise to arbitrary single qubit rotations on each logical qubit or to a
CNOT gate. C) A two qubit teleportation circuit which can be used to understand the propagation of logical qubits along the
horizontal chains indicated in A when qubits are measured in the X basis. D) A modified version of the two qubit teleportation
protocol which can be used to understand the effect of measurements in arbitrary bases in the XY -plane when propagating
logical qubits through the graph, as discussed in [32].
in G, prepare a qubit in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). Then, for each edge e in G, apply a controlled-phase gate
between the qubits corresponding to the vertices joined by e. Since the controlled-phase gates necessarily commute, the
state produced by the circuit is independent of the order of these operations. While the original resource states studied
in the context of MBQC were cluster states [34, 35], the graph for which corresponds to a regular square lattice, the
UBQC protocol made use of a different resource state known as a brickwork state, illustrated in Figure 4. The reason
for this was that the initial insight underlying the UBQC protocol allowed the hiding of only measurements which
projected onto states in the XY -plane of the Bloch sphere. Until very recently cluster states were not known to be
universal without the addition of Z-basis measurements, and so a resource state was constructed which required only
XY -plane measurements. Recent results proving the universality of cluster states with only XY -plane measurements
imply that the UBQC protocol could be trivially modified to use such states [36]. For simplicity, in discussing how
MBQC implements a computation, we will consider only the case of the brickwork state. Readers interested in a more
thorough introduction to this model of computation are referred to [37].
In a measurement-based computation performed on a brickwork state, the planar nature of the underlying graph
has a natural interpretation in terms of the circuit model. Each row of vertices, together with the edges connecting
them, corresponds to a single logical qubit which is propagated from left to right by a sequence of measurements,
as shown in Figure 4A. The initial state of each such logical qubit is |+〉 and initially the state can be thought
of as residing at the leftmost vertex in the chain. Each measurement in a basis Bθ = cos(2θ)X + sin(2θ)Y has
the effect of propagating the logical qubit on vertex to the right and applying the operator XmHRZ(θ), where
RZ(θ) = cos θI+sin θZ and m ∈ {0, 1} is the outcome of the measurement. This is a consequence of a rotated version
of the two-qubit teleportation protocol illustrated in Figures 4C and 4D [31, 32]. The presence of the teleportation
byproduct Xm means that subsequent measurement angles need to be adapted to negate this byproduct in order to
achieve deterministic computation. Thus the measurement bases will in general depend on the outcomes of previous
measurements as well as the intended logic gate they correspond to, a dependency formalised for general graphs by the
notion of flow [38]. The only remaining element unaccounted for, then, are vertical edges in the graph. These can be
seen as controlled-phase gates between logical qubits which occur when both logical qubits have been propagated onto
the vertices linked by a vertical edge. Measurement of the rightmost qubit in each row corresponds to a measurement
of the final state of the computation. Taken together, these two elements can be combined to perform more common
universal gate sets such as arbitrary local unitary operations and CNOTs as shown in Figure 4B.
UBQC was the first protocol to take advantage of measurement-based computation in the context of blind compu-
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FIG. 5: A depiction of the Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC) protocol introduced in [16]. The client prepares
random single qubit states which are then sent to the server to be entangled. For each qubit in turn, the client computes a
measurement angle which is sent to the server, which returns the result to the client for inclusion in the calculation of subsequent
measurement angles.
tation. It achieves blindness by effectively hiding the measurement bases for a measurement-based computation on
a fixed resource state. The UBQC protocol, depicted in Figure 5, proceeds as follows. The client first encodes their
computation as a sequence of measurements at angles φi, chosen from the set A = {0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 }, in the XY -plane
on a brickwork state of dimensions N ×M , proportional to the dimensions of the quantum circuit1 corresponding to
the desired computation. The client then prepares and sends NM single qubit states |ψi〉 = 1√2
(|0〉+ (−1)rieiθ |1〉),
where ri and θi are chosen uniformly at random from the sets {0, 1} and A respectively, and transmits them to the
server2. The server arranges these in a two dimensional grid of N ×M qubits and entangled them with controlled-
phase gates according to the brickwork graph. The computation then proceeds in rounds in which the qubits are
measured sequentially, in a fixed order (going from top to bottom, left to right). In the ith round, the client sends a
measurement angle δi = φ′i − θi to the server, who measures qubit i in this basis and returns the resulting outcome
bi to the client. Here φ′i denotes updated measurement angle for qubit i adapted from φ to account for previous
teleportation byproducts. The client then decodes this outcome to obtain a new bit mi = bi ⊕ ri, which they take
to be the true outcome of the measurement. This entire procedure can be seen to be equivalent to the original
measurement-based computation chosen by the client since rotations about the Z axis commute with the entangling
operations and hence the θi terms included in the state preparation and measurement angle cancel. Furthermore, the
effect of ri is equivalent to applying a Z operation to the initial state, which commutes with the entangling operations
but anti-commutes with the measurement operator, and hence results in a bit flip on the outcome of the measurement
result bi, which is undone in the computation of mi. It is easy to see that the UBQC protocol satisfies the conditions
of the first blindness definition introduced in Section II by noting that only |ψi〉 depends on ri, and as these values are
random, and a priori unknown to the server, the density matrix for the state received by the server is always maximally
mixed, and so fixed and independent of θi. Thus only δi is dependent on θi, which is chosen uniformly at random from
the same set as φi and is a priori unknown to the server, and hence it too is uniformly random and independent of φi
or φ′i. As such, the distribution of messages sent to the server, when averaged over choices of the random variables
{r1, . . . , rNM} and {θ1, . . . , θNM} is fixed as the maximally mixed distribution. Blindness under this first definition
was proved in [16], while security under the stronger composable definition proved in [20]. It is worth noting that while
the resource state requires NM qubits, due to the commutation of operations involving non-neighbouring qubits, not
every qubit needs to be present in the initial state. Indeed, by postponing each controlled-phase operation as long as
possible, it is possible to implement this protocol using only N + 1 qubits.
While the original paper introduced a mechanism for verifying the delegated computation based on the use of
ancillary trap qubits randomly interspersed with the target computation (see Figure 2A), the analysis of verification
given in [16] was incomplete. Subsequently a modified verification technique was proposed based on using physical
qubits rather than logical qubits as traps (see Figure 2B) and proven to suppress arbitrary deviations from the protocol
by the server [22]. The modified BQC protocol also introduced new functionality, making it possible to incorporate
1 The circuit is restricted to nearest neighbour interactions, which can be done without loss of generality.
2 Subsequent work from Dunjko and Kashefi has shown that some level of blindness can be maintained with the client preparing qubits
in only two possible states [8]
8hidden Z-basis measurements within a measurement pattern, and allowing for the entanglement graph to be hidden.
This modified protocol also satisfies the composable security definitions for perfect blindness (i.e. 0-blindness) and
-blind-verifiability discussed in Section II for exponentially small  [18]. The UBQC protocol can also be used as a
method to remotely prepare the states used in the ABE protocol, resulting in a hybrid protocol which requires only
single qubit state preparations [39].
C. Measurement
update
rule
ServerClient
FIG. 6: A depiction of the BQC approach considered by Morimae and Fujii [11], in which the client performs adaptive
measurements on a sequence of qubits sent to them by the server. By having the server send the client a universal resource
state one qubit at a time, the client can implement an arbitrary computation without ever sending information to the server
beyond the initial graph description.
An alternate take on the use of MBQC for blind computation was proposed by Morimae and Fujii [11], which
changed the role of the client from state preparation to measurement. They noted that if the client were capable
of making the adaptive single-qubit measurements necessary to drive a measurement-based computation on a fixed
graph state, then a BQC protocol could be achieved by having the server feed the resource state to the client, one
qubit at a time, as depicted in Figure 6. Such a scheme is trivially blind, since the direction of communication is
always from server to client, and has been shown to satisfy composable security definitions [18, 40]. This approach to
blind computation can be thought of as dual to the UBQC approach, due to the fact that in quantum mechanics there
is a symmetry under post-selection between preparation and measurement. As a result, fault-tolerance constructions
are interchangeable between the two settings, and trap-based verification techniques have been successfully adapted
to this setting [23]. Furthermore, the fact that the server is required only to prepare a fixed state has lead to new
approaches to verification based on directly testing that this state has been prepared using stabiliser measurements
[41, 42].
Arguments have been made in both directions over whether state preparation or measurement is a more practical
option for the client’s device. This will of course depend on the physical implementation under consideration. At
least at present, however, photons appear to be the only reasonable choice for long range quantum communication.
In this setting, there is indeed a case that measurement may be easier than state preparation due to the difficulty of
constructing deterministic single photon sources and the relative ease with which photons can be detected at short
wavelengths. There are some gaps in this line of reasoning, however, since it has been shown that weak coherent pulses
[43], easily producible by an attenuated laser, suffice for the state preparation approach. Furthermore, BQC schemes
in which the client makes measurements directly on a resource state prepared by the server are extremely susceptible
to photon loss and hence require both extremely high efficiency detectors and near lossless communications links. One
possible way to take advantage of the best features of each approach is to make use of an a hybrid of the two. It
was noted in [16] that the classical-quantum (CQ) correlations between the client and server necessary to implement
the UBQC protocol could be achieved by measurements made on half of an entangled state with the other half held
by the server. This is simply due to the fact that measuring one qubit of a singlet state in a basis Bθ results in the
other qubit being projected onto either 1√
2
(|0〉 ± eiθ |1〉) where the sign depends on the outcome of the measurement.
Thus by having the server feed the client one half of an entangled pair for each qubit to be prepared, the client can
effectively remotely prepare the input states used by the server in state-preparation BQC and verification protocols.
This can be combined with self-testing of the underlying singlet states to achieve verification in a device-independent
9fashion [44, 45]. Importantly, in this approach failure by the client to detect a photon is not a significant problem,
since the procedure can be repeated until remote preparation of the requisite number of qubits has been achieved,
resulting in overhead which scales only inversely with the probability of a single measurement attempt succeeding.
Thus a client making use of a single low quality detector and lossy links could still make use of BQC.
IV. BQC WITH MULTIPLE SERVERS
classical
control
quantum
computer
quantum memory
shared entanglement
Server 2ClientServer
quantum
computer
quantum memory
Server 1
FIG. 7: The scenario considered by current multi-server protocols. The client communicates classically with two or more
servers. The servers are prohibited from communicating with each other directly, but are required to share a large number of
entangled qubits.
The insight discussed in the previous section, that the CQ correlations necessary to implement the UBQC protocol
could be achieved through measurements on one half of a bipartite entangled state, immediately gives rise to a version
of the UBQC protocol, also introduced in [16], in which the client is entirely classical. This required the addition
of a second server which shares an entangled state with the first. Importantly, the two servers are restricted from
communicating with each other. This situation is depicted in Figure 7. By requesting the second server measure
their half of the shared entangled state in a specified random basis, the client can establish that the correct initial
distribution of states with the first server without revealing anything about their computation. They can then proceed
with the UBQC protocol as usual. While blindness in this setting follows directly from the proof of blindness in the
case where the client prepares and transmits quantum states, the situation for verification is more complicated and
the argument for security initially proposed in [16] does not hold for the most general adversarial behaviour.
The first schemes to achieve delegation and verification of quantum computation by an entirely classical client to
a set of entangled servers were introduced by Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani [13, 24] and McKague [46] using self-
testing techniques based on CHSH games. While the structure of the protocols varies significantly, neither disclose the
computation to the servers and thus both can be considered blind. The construction considered by Reichardt et al has
the advantage of requiring only two servers, while that of McKague requires a significantly larger number of servers.
One advantage of McKague’s protocol over the RUV protocol is that the incurred overhead scales more gently (O(n22)
as compared to O(n8191) where n is the sum of the number of logical gates and qubits). Subsequent efforts were made
to lower this overhead by making use of self-tested remote state preparation as input for a verifiable blind computation
protocol (that of [22]), proposed independently in somewhat different forms in [44] and [47]. These managed to reduce
the the overhead to O(n4 log n) in the setting of polynomially many servers [44], a scaling subsequently also achieved
by [48] by other means, and O(n2048) for the two server setting [47]. Subsequent work has sought to improve this
overhead requirement further [45]. In this regard, a new self-testing procedure introduced by Natarajan and Vidick
[27] which does not scale with the number of entangled pairs to be verified shows particular promise.
The above mentioned protocols share at least two common features. Each requires a number of rounds of commu-
nication which scales polynomially with depth of the computation and each is either natively blind or can be made
blind with trivial adaptations. Recently, however, a class of non-blind verification protocols have emerged based on
one-round interactive proofs for the local Hamiltonian which require extremely little communication [49, 50]. These
can be exploited to yield verification a method for verifying delegated quantum computation by constructing a Hamil-
tonian to encode the chosen computation and its purported output and then executing an interactive proof to verify
that the ground state energy of this Hamiltonian is below a fixed threshold [25–27]. This casts into question the link
between verification and blindness.
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Multi-server approaches have the advantage of eliminating the need for any quantum capability on the part of the
client, but this comes at a significant price, both in terms of overhead (particularly for verifiable schemes) and in terms
of the additional assumptions regarding a lack of communication between servers. These additional assumptions mean
that it is likely impossible in practice to maintain blindness indefinitely, due to the lack of a physical mechanism to
prevent communication between servers over arbitrary timescales in an adversarial setting.
V. COMPUTING ON ENCRYPTED DATA AND HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
As noted in Section II, blind quantum computation can be achieved by applying a fixed unitary operation to an
input which encodes the full circuit to be evaluated together with any associated input states. This forms a concrete
link to the notion of computing on encrypted data, a regime similar to blind computation but in which the operation
to be evaluated is public. This corresponds to the setting initially considered by Childs, as discussed in Section
IIIA. Progress on protocols of this type has continues to be made, with Fisher et al introducing a protocol which
reduced the requirements on the client to preparation of specific single qubit states, similar to the requirement for the
UBQC protocol, while implementing logic gates in a manner similar to Childs’ original scheme [51]. This approach
necessarily sacrificed the native ability to hide the computation being performed, unless a large programmable circuit
were to be implemented. However, the result of this sacrifice was a significant saving in communications requirements
over the UBQC protocol in the regime where only the data must be hidden, since Clifford group gates could be
evaluated without quantum communication. Furthermore, this protocol has been proven secure under an appropriate
composable security definition in a companion paper by Broadbent [52]. In this context, Broadbent also proposed a
mechanism for verifying that a specified computation had been carried out correctly [21], formulated as an interactive
proof for BQP, making use of hidden computations for which the expected outcome can be computed by the client,
similar in spirit to the trap techniques proposed in [16] and [22].
Fisher et al were far from alone in seeking to reduce the communications overhead required for delegating quantum
computation. In the context of blind quantum computation the minimum communications requirements have been
analysed both in terms of total communication requirements [17] and in terms of quantum communication requirements
[53] for a number of client settings, with protocols proposed which come close to saturating these lower bounds.
Surprisingly, it has been shown that a client with the ability to adaptively prepare multi-qubit states can make use
of an iterated teleportation procedure in order to delegate certain quantum computations with exponentially less
communication than is required to classically describe the circuit being implemented [54].
In the world of classical cryptography, the state of the art regarding computation on encrypted data has changed
dramatically over the years since the introduction of the first BQC protocols, with the advent of fully homomorphic
encryption [55]. Fully homomorphic encryption schemes allow data to be processed arbitrarily in its encrypted form,
without the need for the encryption key. Such encryption schemes allow for computing on encrypted data without
need for communication between client and server during the processing. Achieving such a reduction in round
complexity in the context of delegated quantum computation would be highly desirable. It should be noted, however,
that even in the classical context this has only been achieved by making use of assumptions about the hardness
of certain computational problems, such as the approximate shortest vector problem [56, 57] or the learning with
errors problem [58]. While for many cryptographic problems quantum mechanics has offer to replace computational
security guarantees with information theoretic ones, this does not appear to be the case here. No-go theorems ruling
out evaluation of arbitrary quantum circuits on encrypted data with perfect [59] and near-perfect [60] information
theoretic security 3. Nonetheless some progress has been made on developing quantum analogues of homomorphic
encryption. Several works have explored the use of partially-homomorphic encryption which support models of
computation not classically simulable, including the Boson sampling model [62], under weakened information theoretic
security guarantees [63, 64]. Broadbent and Jeffery introduced a homomorphic encryption scheme which leveraged
a computationally secure classical homomorphic encryption scheme to enable evaluation of circuits containing only
a constant number of non-Clifford gates on encrypted quantum data [65]. In the case of Broadbent and Jeffery’s
scheme, the size of the encoding scaled exponentially with the number of non-Clifford gates. However subsequent
work by Dulek, Schaffner and Speelman reduced this to only polynomial overhead, resulting in a computationally
secure levelled homomorphic encryption scheme [66]. These latter protocols can be seen as part of a wider programme
to broaden quantum cryptographic techniques through the incorporation of computational assumptions [67]. A recent
proposal achieves similar functionality to the Broadbent-Jeffery scheme but under an information theoretic security
3 It should be noted that the term “quantum homomorphic encryption” was first coined by Min Liang [61], though it was used to refer to a
class of interactive protocols more akin to computing on encrypted data than to a quantum analog of classical homomorphic encryption.
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definition, provided a sufficiently large key is used [68]. To date, however, no such counterpart to the work of Dulek,
Schaffner and Speelman has been found.
VI. PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATIONS
The discussion thus far has focused on theoretical constructions for delegated computation protocols. However, if
these protocols are to become anything other than theoretical curiosities, it is important to establish a path to physical
realisation. To this end, a number of works have sought to make blind and verifiable computation protocols more
accessible to experiment. This has taken several forms. While early proposals noted that their constructions could
be made fault-tolerant [12, 16], significant work has since been put into computing explicit fault-tolerance thresholds
for blind computation [69, 70] and dealing with the issue of noise occurring during quantum communication between
client and server [70–72]. Issues of fault-tolerance have also been examined in the context of verification [73–75], a
subtle topic which is often under-examined in the literature. In the context of multiple-server protocols, the issue
of overcoming noisy correlations between servers has also been addressed in the form of entanglement distillation
protocols [76, 77]. Aside from the issue of noise, recent work has also sought enable blind computation based on
resource states potentially more amenable to experiment, including proposed BQC protocols based on continuous
variables [78] and the ground states of certain Hamiltonians [79]. In particular, the adaptation of the UBQC protocol
to use client-supplied weak coherent states, rather than individual qubits, has received significant attention due to
the potential to significantly reduce the technological burden on the client [43, 80, 81].
(                           )
ServerClient
matter qubits
polarization
control
polarization
analysis
FIG. 8: Hybrid architectures combining matter qubits contained in the server with optical qubits for communication present
a possible path to overcoming some of the hurdles faced by the current generation of experiments. One potential approach
is to make use of trapped ions or similar matter qubits to perform the computation which can emit photons entangled with
the matter system. Using the remote state preparation approach described in Section III C, measurements made by the client
could then be used to remotely establish correlations with the matter qubits in the server sufficient to implement UBQC-like
protocols. In the example depicted above the state of the matter qubits is taken to be entangled with polarization degree of
the photon, however other degrees of freedom could also be used. The ability to create such entangled states between matter
and photonic qubits has already been demonstrated for a number of systems [82, 83].
To date, several delegated computation protocols have been successfully demonstrated in a quantum optics setting.
Barz et al performed a successful demonstration of the UBQC protocol using a four qubit resource state entangled
according to a variety of graphs, corresponding to subgraphs of the brickwork state [84]. The reported experiments
blindly implemented both the Deutsch-Josza algorithm [85] and Grover’s search algorithm [86], although in each case
experimental limitations required that only certain measurement were hidden, corresponding to the choice of oracle
for each problem. Subsequently, similar experiments were used to demonstration of a verifiable blind computation
protocol modified from theoretical work previously presented in [22]. The client-measuring protocol of Morimae and
Fujii has also been demonstrated using a four qubit cluster state [87], which included a replication of the verification
method used in [88] in the new client setting. Finally, in the paper proposing their protocol for computing on encrypted
data, Fisher et al included an experimental demonstration using photonic qubits, where they demonstrated individual
quantum gates sufficient for universal quantum computation [51].
While photons are the clear choice for communication between client and server in blind computation protocols,
they are less well suited to the business of performing large scale computation. This is due to a combination of factors
including the destructive nature of current measurement techniques and the difficulty of performing deterministic
entangling gates between photonic qubits. Thus, while universal computation is possible with linear optics [33], a
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hybrid system, such as that depicted in Figure 8, involving matter qubits for computation and photonic qubits for
communication may prove a more viable path for scalable blind quantum computation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Given recent developments in quantum technologies and the longstanding paradigm in classical computing of del-
egating computationally intensive tasks to shared systems, the emerging interest in delegated quantum computation
is both understandable and timely. While the progress discussed in this review illustrates the potential of blind
quantum computation and related protocols, the field is still in its infancy, with new results coming on a regular basis
but with many open questions still remaining. Perhaps the most prominent open question is that of whether or not
blind or verifiable computation is possible with a single server and a completely classical client. In this setting, even
when multiple non-entangled non-communicating servers are allowed, the existence of secure protocols for blind and
verifiable computation remains an open question. Indeed, the precise relationship between blindness and verification
is currently unresolved. In the context of homomorphic encryption, the existence of fully homomorphic quantum
encryption under plausible computational assumptions remains open, despite the promising progress of Dulek et al
[66]. In the context of verification, the most significant challenges facing the field include the necessity to drastically
reduce overhead and sensitivity to noise of current device-independent verification protocols, and the development of
methods to verify analogue quantum simulators and other special purpose devices. While some progress has been
made on the question of verifying non-universal devices [89–91], much more progress in this direction is necessary
to fully unlock the potential of such devices. Lastly it should be noted that progress to date has only scratched the
surface of the variety of functionality that future quantum networks may unlock. Recent developments, in terms of
multi-user blind computation [92] and publicly verifiable quantum computation [93], together with established results
on secure multi-party quantum computation [29, 94, 95] give some indication of the potential for new secure quantum
computing protocols beyond the two party setting. Given these open questions, there is the potential for significant
theoretical advance in the coming years. Harnessing the latest advances in experimental capabilities to go beyond the
current generation of proof-of-principle experiments is also likely to be an important future direction.
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